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Abstract 
Recent behavioral, neuroimaging, and neurophysiological research suggest a common 
representational code mediating the observation and execution of actions; yet, the nature of this 
representational code is not well understood.  We address this question by investigating whether 
this observation-execution matching system (or mirror system) codes both the constituent 
movements of an action as well as its goal, and how such sensitivity is influenced by the top-
down effects of instructions.  Automatic imitation of observed finger actions was tested by 
manipulating whether the movements were biomechanically possible or impossible, while 
holding the goal constant.  When no mention was made of this difference (Experiment 1), 
comparable automatic imitation was elicited from possible and impossible actions, suggesting 
that the actions had been coded at the level of the goal.  When attention was drawn to the 
difference between possible and impossible movements (Experiment 2), only possible 
movements elicited automatic imitation.  This sensitivity was specific to imitation, not affecting 
spatial S-R compatibility (Experiment 3).  These results suggest that the human mirror system 
isautomatic imitation is modulated by top-down influences, coding actions in terms of both 
movements and goals depending on the focus of attention. 
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Automatic Imitation of Biomechanically Possible and Impossible Actions: 
Effects of Priming Movements vs. Goals 
 
The ability to understand the actions and mental states of those around us is crucial for 
interacting effectively in our social world.  In recent years, the motor system has been directly 
implicated in the understanding of others’ actions; observation of actions results in covert 
simulation, enabling the observer to copy and subsequently understand the actions, goals and 
intentions of the other person (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001).  Complementary lines of 
behavioral, neuroimaging, and neurophysiological research suggest a common representational 
code mediating the observation and the planning or execution of action.  Behaviorally, for 
example, this common code manifests itself in automatic imitation, the tendency of even healthy 
adults to reproduce observed actions completely unintentionally and automatically (Darwin, 
1872/1965).  Such effects have been documented in numerous recent controlled experimental 
situations (e.g., Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 
2000; Castiello, Lusher, Mari, Edwards, & Humphreys, 2002; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Edwards, Humphreys, & Castiello, 2003; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; Jonas et al., 
in press2007; Longo, 2006; Longo & Bertenthal, 2006, 2007; Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005; 
Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003). 
Attentional Weighting Effects on Common Coding 
What is the basis for these shared representations?  According to the theory of event 
coding (TEC) of Hommel et al. (2001), perceptual and motor events are coded in terms of a 
shared set of features.  While the degree of featural overlap between perceptual and motor events 
is often described as being a function of their similarity (e.g., Knoblich & Flach, 2003), Hommel 
et al. claim that the salience of particular features will vary as a function of task, context, and the 
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direction of attention.  According to TEC, this feature weighting can be induced by both 
intentional and attentional influences, resulting from highlighting of features of the response and 
of the stimulus, respectively. 
 An informative example of intentional weighting comes from an experiment by Hommel 
(1993) who instructed participants to press either a left-hand or right-hand key depending on the 
pitch of a tone presented to either the left or right ear.  Pressing a button with the right hand led 
to the illumination of a light on the left and vice versa.  The participants were instructed to either 
‘press a left or right button’ or ‘switch on a right or left light’.  In both cases, the actual response 
was the same even though the goal or effect of the action differed as a function of the instruction.  
When the response had beenwas described in terms of pressing a button, a standard Simon effect 
was observed; right-hand responses were faster when the tone was presented to the right ear, and 
vice versa.  When the response had beenwas described in terms of illuminating the light, this 
pattern reversed; the compatibility effect depended on the location of the light, rather than the 
location of the pressed button being pressed .  Thus, whether attention had beenwas drawn to a 
more proximal (pressing the button) or a more distal (illuminating the light) aspect of the action 
determined whether the action was coded as ‘leftward’ or ‘rightward’. 
Memelink and Hommel (2006), similarly, used a two-dimensional Simon task in which 
spatial compatibility could vary along horizontal (left-right) and vertical (top-bottom) 
dimensions.  This task was interleaved with a logically unrelated priming task which could 
involve either the horizontal or vertical dimension.  The magnitude of the Simon effect was 
increased along the dimension suggested by the priming task.  This result suggests that the 
relative weights of the horizontal and vertical dimensions were flexibly adjusted depending on 
the requirements of the task.  Other studies using a similar two-dimensional Simon paradigm 
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have foundreport that simply describing the response-keys using horizontal (i.e., “right”/”left”) 
or vertical (i.e., “top”/”bottom”) labels increases the magnitude of the Simon effect along the 
instructed dimension, and reduces it along the uninstructed dimension (Hommel, 1996; Vu & 
Proctor, 2001, 2002; but see Memelink & Hommel, 2005).  Even on a single-dimensional 
paradigm, Wenke, Nattkemper, and Frensch (2006) showed that the Simon effect was larger 
when participants were instructed to code responses spatially than when they were instructed to 
code responses as “blue” vs. “green.”  Similar to the preceding tasks, Wenke and Frensch (2005) 
found interference between concurrent verbal and manual tasks, but only when the same labels 
were used to describe the responses in both dimensions. 
 The Simon effect is only one of a number of different examples of S-R compatibility.  
Other dimensions besides spatial location can overlap and result in a response time advantage 
(e.g., Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990).  Thus far, most studies investigating the effects of 
intentional/attentional weighting on S-R compatibility have utilized Simon tasks.  While these 
studies find unequivocal evidence that the attentional focus or intentions of the participant 
influence spatial S-R compatibility, it is not clear what role intentional/attentional factors play in 
other S-R compatibility effects, such as automatic imitation.  One suggestive study by Lakin and 
Chartrand (2003) found that priming subjects with words related to affiliation and rapport 
increased the frequency of behavioral mimicry, presumably because mimicry increases affiliative 
tendencies and vice versa (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
A few neuroimaging studies are also relevant to this issue.  Iacoboni and colleagues 
(2005) found that the activation of premotor mirror areas in the human brain was modulated by 
the behavioral context in which an action was embedded, arguing that the intention of the 
perceived act was being  coded, not just the goal.  Interestingly, this result was not affected by 
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instructing participants to attend to the object and infer the intention of the actor.  From this lack 
of sensitivity to instructions, Iacoboni and colleagues suggested “that top-down influences are 
unlikely to modulate the activity of mirror neuron areas” (p. 532).  This conclusion, however, is 
difficult to reconcile with other findings suggesting that instructions can modulate mirror system 
activation.  Grèzes, Costes, and Decety (1998) found increased premotor activation in response 
to action observation when participants were told they would subsequently have to imitate the 
action as opposed to simply watch the action.  Similarly, Zentgraf and colleagues (2005) told 
participants that after the study they would have to either imagine performing or evaluate the 
quality of observed gymnastics sequences, and found greater activation in both frontal and 
parietal mirror areas in the imagery than in the evaluation condition. 
 Overall, these imaging studies of the human mirror system do not yield a consistent 
picture of the effects of top-down influences on motor responses following the perception of an 
action.  Furthermore, it is difficult to translate the results from these neuroimaging studies into 
behavioral effects.  The present study was designed to provide a more direct test of the effects of 
attentional weighting on automatic imitation by testing whether explicitly directing attention to 
the movements of a perceived action would affect the likelihood of eliciting automatic imitation 
based on goals vs. movements. 
Common Coding of Movements vs. Goals 
Actions are coded at multiple, hierarchically nested levels of representation, ranging from 
activation of specific muscles, to direction of movement, to goal completion (Arbib, 1985; 
Jeannerod, 1997; Kakei, Hoffman, & Strick, 1999).  As Hommel (2006) writes (p. 168): 
“Every action we perform can be described in many ways and with regard to many levels: The same 
movement of one’s hand may be described in terms of the muscle movements involved, with regard to the 
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emerging kinematic pattern, as the “signing of a contract,” or with respect to the socially defined meaning 
this signature has in the given context.” 
Numerous authors have pointed out tThe ability of humans to imitate actions at multiple levels, 
either in terms of goals (or effects) or of movements (e.g., Koffka, 1924/1959; Miller & Dollard, 
1941; Morgan, 1900; Stränger & Hommel, 1995), which areis associated with different patterns 
of neural activity (Chaminade, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2002).  Nevertheless, prevalence is often 
attributed to goals (e.g., Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Prinz, 2002; Wohlschläger, 
Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003).  Wohlschläger et al., for example, suggest that “it is primarily the 
goal of an act that is imitated; how that goal is achieved is only of secondary interest” (p. 502).  
In line with this focus on goals in imitation, theories of common coding, generally agree that 
matching of perceived and produced actions occurs primarily or exclusively at the level of distal 
effects or goals
1
 (e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 2002; 
Wohlschläger et al., 2003).  Similarly, mirror neurons in monkeys selectively code actions at the 
level of goals (Gallese et al., 1996), sometimes responding only to those actions that fit the 
appropriate behavioral context (Fogassi et al., 2005). 
In the context of this discussion, it is important to distinguish the ability of humans to 
imitate actions from the tendency of humans to automatically imitate observed actions (e.g., 
Koffka, 1924/1959; McDougall, 1908; Morgan, 1900; Stränger & Hommel, 1995).  The studies 
of Bekkering, Wohlschläger, and colleagues (e.g., Bekkering et al., 2000; Wohlschläger & 
Bekkering, 2002; Wohlschläger et al., 2003) have found goals to be of particular importance in 
cases where participants were explicitly instructed to imitate what a model did.  By contrast, it is 
not clear if it is goals or movements that play a role in the automatic tendency of people to 
imitate observed actions.  In many tasks, it is difficult to isolate the effects of movements 
because they typically covary with goals.  Holding and squeezing an orange, for example, differ 
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both in terms of movements and goals.  Thus, differences in the manner of movement are 
typically confounded by differences in the goal of the movement. 
Recently, a few authors have suggested that, at least in humans, movements may play a 
larger role in the representation of perceived actions than had previously been supposed.  
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Gallese (2002), for example, speculate that two distinct 
“resonance mechanisms” may underlie imitation in humans: a high-level resonance mechanism 
coding action in terms of goals, and a low-level resonance mechanism sensitive to the 
movements constituting an action.  Lyons, Santos, and Keil (2006) similarly suggest that the 
mirror system in monkeys may code perceived actions only in terms of their goals or underlying 
intentions, whereas, the human mirror system codes actions more flexibly and at multiple levels 
of abstraction, both in terms of goals and the manner in which those goals are achieved.  A 
similar view was put forward by Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004). 
Some preliminary evidence supporting this interpretation that the human mirror system 
represents movements, in addition to goals comes from a series of studies by Gangitano, 
Mattaghy, and Pascual-Leone (2001, 2004) who applied transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to motor cortex as participants watched a hand reach and grasp an object.  By 
manipulating when in the time course of the grasp TMS was applied, they demonstrated that the 
motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded from arm muscles varied systematically with the 
finger aperture over the course of the reach.  This finding thus suggests that the mental 
simulation of the observed action included the manner in which the action is performed over 
time, and does not exclusively represent the goal, or end state. 
Overview of the Present StudStatement of the Problemy 
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The goal of the present study was to examined the role of attentional weighting in 
automatic imitation.  In particular, we investigated how directing attention to the manner in 
which actions were performed would affects the relative influence of goals and movements in the 
common coding of perceived and produced actions.  The basic logic was to present actions 
which are either biomechanically possible or impossible in terms of movements, but which are 
identical in terms of goals (i.e., tapping a surface; see Figure 1).  If the actions are coded in terms 
of goals, comparable levels of automatic imitation should be elicited from both types of action, 
since the goals are the same.  If, in contrast, the actions are coded in terms of their constituent 
movements, automatic imitation should be attenuated for the impossible actions compared to the 
possible ones, given that actions that are physically difficult or impossible to perform (e.g., 
moving a hand through another body part) or are not performed by the observer (e.g., ballet 
dancing) are less likely to activate cortical areas associated with the mirror system (Buccino et 
al., 2004; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, 
Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 2000).   
Automatic imitation was measured with an S-R compatibility paradigm developed 
previously (Bertenthal et al., 2006), adapted from a task used by Brass and colleagues (2000).  
Participants were presented with two-frame apparent motion stimuli showing either the index or 
middle finger of a right or a left hand moving down and tapping a surface.  They were instructed 
to respond to the relative spatial position of the index and middle fingers by pressing a button 
with their right index finger if the stimulus finger appearing to the left moved, and with their 
right middle finger if the finger appearing to the right moved.  When a left hand stimulus was 
presented, the response finger matched the stimulus finger anatomically (see Figure 1); 
participants responded to an index finger movement with their index finger, and to a middle 
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finger movement with their middle finger (anatomically compatible condition).  When a right 
hand stimulus was presented, this pattern was reversed; participants responded to an index finger 
movement with their middle finger, and to a middle finger movement with their index finger 
(anatomically incompatible condition).  If automatic imitation of the anatomically matching 
finger occurs, responses should be faster to the compatible (left hand) stimulus than to the 
incompatible (right hand) stimulus, the pattern observed in our earlier study (Bertenthal et al.).  
Participants were instructed only to respond to the spatial cue, no mention whatsoever was made 
of imitation.   
In our original study (Bertenthal et al., 2006) we elicited automatic imitation using a 
video image of a human hand; in the present study we used a computer-generated graphical 
hand.  The use of a virtual hand allows presentation of biomechanically impossible finger 
movements, which were needed for the current investigation.  We recently found that such a 
computer-generated hand elicits comparable automatic imitation as a video image of an actual 
hand (Longo, 2006)
2
. 
Three experiments were conducted.  Experiment 1 compared automatic imitation of 
biomechanically possible and impossible finger movements without mentioning anything about 
the presence of impossible movements, allowing us to investigate how actions are 
spontaneous.lyspontaneously coded.  Experiment 2 investigated the effects of attentional 
weighting on automatic imitation.  Participants were explicitly told at the beginning of the 
experiment that they would see both “natural” and “impossible” finger movements to direct 
attention to the manner in which the actions were performed.  Experiment 3 was designed as a 
control to make sure that differences observed between the first two experiments did not the 
result from participants being distracted by the novelty of the impossible finger movements, and 
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also to examine whether sensitivity to the manner in which an action was performed would 
generalize to another form of S-R compatibility, specifically spatial compatibility (cf. Simon, 
1969), which would not be expected to be influenced by the biomechanics of a perceived action. 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment tested the sensitivity of automatic imitation to possible and 
impossible finger movements without any mention of this distinction.  As previously discussed, 
it is still unclear whether people show a tendency to automatically imitate goals or movements of 
observed actions.  If actions are coded in terms of goals, comparable imitation should be elicited 
from both possible and impossible movements.  If, however, actions are coded in terms of 
movements, imitation should be reduced or eliminated when the movements are biomechanically 
impossible, because the match between observed and executed actions will have diminished in 
this condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four students at the University of Chicago (15 female; 9 male) between 18 and 
34 years of age participated.  All were right-handed, as determined by the Edinburgh Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971), M = 83.20, range: 44.44 – 100, naive as to the purpose of the study, and paid 
for their participation.  An additional five participants were excluded from analyses due to error 
rates exceeding 25%.  Given the simplicity of the task, the large number of participants 
eliminated due to high error rates deserves some comment.  Error rates for these five participants 
were extremely high in the incompatible condition (79.25%), but quite low in the compatible 
condition (5.00%).  This suggests that even though the experimenter observed performance 
during practice trials to make sure the task was being done correctly, participants had 
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subsequently spontaneously switched from responding on the basis of the relative spatial position 
of the moving finger, to responding on the basis of the anatomically identity of the finger.  That 
is, they weren’t really making a large proportion of errors, per se, but were responding 
systematically to the wrong dimension of the stimulus.  Even though the spatial dimension of the 
fingers leads to a larger priming effect than does anatomical identity (Bertenthal et al., 2006), 
participants seem to find it more natural to respond to the identity – intentionally imitating the 
hand – than to the spatial position.  This pattern of errors is consistent with a strong automatic 
tendency of people to imitate observed actions. 
 An additional eight volunteers at University College London (4 female; 4 male) rated the 
stimuli, but did not complete the full paradigm. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Stimuli were displayed on a 43.2 cm computer monitor.  Participants were seated at a 
comfortable distance approximately 60 cm from the monitor.  The hand displayed on the screen 
measured a visual angle 13.3º horizontally and 10º vertically, and was embedded in a blue 
rectangular region measuring approximately 20º x 13.3º.  The displacement of the moving index 
and middle fingers was approximately 1.9º of visual angle.  E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was used for stimulus presentation and data collection. 
The computer-generated hand and arm was created from a high-resolution three-
dimensional mesh model (purchased from Viewpoint, New York, NY) consisting of 
approximately 200,000 polygons and 16 vertices.  After creating the structure and texture of the 
hand, the model was imported into 3D Studio Max (Autodesk, San Rafael, CA) and 22 bones 
from the upper shoulder to the tip of the fingers were added.  The bones were sized to the mesh 
model, and then each bone was connected in order starting from the finger tips and ending at the 
Comment [S1]: What was the age range 
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shoulder.  Rotation points were positioned at each of the joints and inverse kinematics solvers 
were added to create biomechanically realistic movements for the fingers, hand, wrist, elbow and 
shoulders.  The movement was accomplished by either a flexion of the finger at the metacaropo-
phalangeal joint (possible movement) or by a flexion of the finger at the metacaropo-phalangeal 
joint in combination with a greater than 90
o
 hyperextension of the finger at the proximal 
interphalangeal joint (impossible movement).  The 3D model was then positioned in a visual 
scene consisting of a homogeneous flat blue surface, and lighting and cameras were positioned to 
illuminate the hand and create faint shadows of the fingers (see Figure 1). 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
 Ratings of the stimuli were obtained from an additional  eight participants (4 female; 4 
male).  Participants were shown the eight finger movements used in the experiments formed by 
crossing hand (left, right), finger (index, middle), and possibility (impossible, possible).  Order 
of finger movements was randomized.  They were told that they would see short clips of finger 
movements and, after each, would be asked to rate their agreement with several statements 
(listed in Figure 2).  Ratings were made on a seven-point Likert scale with a score of 3 indicating 
that the participant “strongly agreed” with the statement, a score of -3 that they “strongly 
disagreed”, and a score of 0 that they “neither agreed nor disagreed”.  The statements were read 
by the experimenter and responses were made verbally. 
Design and Procedure 
 Participants in the main experiment were instructed to respond by pressing the ‘1’ or ‘3’ 
keys on the number pad of a keyboard with the index or middle finger, respectively, of their right 
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hand in response to the relative spatial position (left/right) of the index and middle fingers of the 
stimulus hand.  The experiment consisted of 16 blocks of 20 trials, 10 each of index and middle 
finger movements.  Blocks alternated between left and right hands and (every other block) 
between possible and impossible finger movements.  Order of blocks was counterbalanced 
across participants.  Experimental trials were preceded by practice blocks of the four conditions 
(each consisting of 20 trials), which were not included in analyses. 
 Each trial began with a frame lasting 533 ms showing the hand at rest.  The second frame 
showed one of the fingers having moved down and resting on the table.  There was no 
interstimulus interval.  This frame lasted 1,000 ms, and was followed by a blue screen lasting 
1,467 ms.  Thus, each trial lasted a total of 3 sec. 
Results and Discussion 
 Two questions were addressed in this section.  The first concerned whether the two 
computer-generated finger tapping events were differentiable in terms of one appearing 
consistent with a possible biomechanical movement and the other appearing consistent with an 
impossible biomechanical movement.  The second question concerned whether automatic 
imitation would be elicited by both possible and impossible finger movements. 
Stimuli Ratings. Stimuli were rated by the eight participants, none of whom who did not 
participated in the main experiment.  The rRatings of the stimuli are shown in Figure 2.  
Participants who rated the stimuli strongly agreed that the possible finger movements looked like 
an action they could perform themselves, 2.91, t(7) = 44.19, p < .0001; like an action that most 
people could perform, 2.91, t(7) = 44.19, p < .0001; and that the finger movement looked natural, 
2.52, t(7) = 9.25, p < .0001.  They strongly disagreed that the possible finger movement looked 
like something they couldn’t do, -2.94, t(7) = -71.79, p < .0001; and that the finger looked 
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broken, -2.78, t(7) = -23.20, p < .0001.  In contrast, participants strongly disagreed that the 
impossible finger movements looked like an action they could perform themselves, -2.09, t(7) = -
3.10, p < .02; like an action most people could perform, -2.28, t(7) = -6.06, p < .001; and that the 
finger movement looked natural, -2.59, t(7) = -13.75, p < .0001.  They strongly agreed, however, 
that the impossible finger movements looked like something they couldn’t do, 2.03, t(7) = 3.14, 
p < .02; and that the finger looked broken, 2.41, t(7) = 9.01, p < .0001. 
These ratings provide strong evidence that the manipulation of possible vs. impossible 
movements was successful.  Participants overwhelmingly rated the possible movements as 
looking like natural actions they and others could perform, and the impossible movements as 
unnatural actions with broken fingers that neither they nor others could perform.  These ratings 
were unanimous with the single exception of one participant who claimed to be “triple-jointed” 
and rated the impossible finger movements as something that he – but not people generally – 
could do.  He agreed that the impossibly moving finger looked broken, and disagreed that it 
looked natural.  For this reason, participants in all experiments who claimed to be “double-
jointed” or “triple-jointed” were excluded from analyses. 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Main Experiment. A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on 
mean response time (RT) with compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and movement 
(possible, impossible) as variables.  Error trials and trials in which RT was faster than 200 ms or 
slower than 1,000 ms were excluded from analysis.  There was a significant compatibility effect, 
F(1, 23) = 9.71, p < .01, partial η2 = .297 (see Figure 3); response times were faster to Formatted: Font: Italic
Formatted: Superscript
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anatomically compatible (313.05 ms) than incompatible (320.56 ms) finger movements, 
indicating that participants automatically imitated the actions, replicating the finding of 
Bertenthal et al. (2006).  RT was comparable to possible (315.85 ms) and impossible (317.76) 
movements, F(1, 23) = .67, n.s., partial η2 = .028, and there was no significant interaction 
between movement and compatibility, F(1, 23) = .04, n.s, partial η2 = .002.  Planned 
comparisons revealed significant compatibility effects for both possible (7.08 ms), t(23) = 2.72, p 
< .02, and impossible (7.95 ms), t(23) = 2.07, p < .05, finger movements (see Figure 2), which 
did not differ significantly, t(23) = .20, n.s. 
Errors were made on 3.41% of trials, and 1.35% of trials were excluded due to RT less 
than 200 ms or exceeding 1,000 ms.  The pattern of errors mirrored that of response times, 
though there were no significant differences between conditions. 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
 Comparable automatic imitation was elicited from both possible and impossible 
movement, suggesting that finger movements were coded in terms of the goal (i.e., tapping a 
surface), as suggested by common coding theorists (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 2002).  
This insensitivity to the difference in movements is consistent with recent neuroimaging and 
physiological evidence presented by Aglioti and colleagues (Costantini et al., 2005; Romani, 
Cesari, Urgesi, Facchini, & Aglioti, 2005).  Using fMRI, these researchers found similar 
activation of premotor mirror system regions elicited from observation of biomechanically 
possible and impossible actions (Costantini et al.),; while using TMS, they found similar cortio-
spinal excitability elicited by the observation of possible and impossible finger movements 
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(Romani et al.).  Although several studies have found that actions that are not in one’s motor 
repertoire at all (e.g., ballet moves) fail to activate the human mirror system less that those that 
are (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006), the present results and those of Aglioti and 
colleagues suggest that this is not the case when actions are impossible only in the manner in 
which they are performed.  This pattern is consistent with the central role of goals in the 
representation of actions. 
Although these results reveal no apparent sensitivity of common coding mechanisms to 
the differences between possible and impossible movements, it is conceivable given the evidence 
reviewed in the Introduction that this sensitivity is modulated by the significance of the stimulus 
information or the direction of attention.  In this firste main experiment, it was only necessary to 
attend to the outcome of the finger movement; the manner in which the action was performed 
was irrelevant to the task.  Indeed, a few of these participants reported not even noticing anything 
unusual about the impossible finger movements and, of those that did notice, several commented 
on the strangeness of some movements, but were unable to describe precisely what it was that 
was aberrant.  Participants who explicitly rated the stimuli, however, clearly judged the 
‘possible’ actions as possible, and the ‘impossible’ actions as impossible.  These findings suggest 
that when attention was not directed to the manner in which actions were performed, they were 
perceived exclusively at the level of goals, and participants showed a form of inattentional 
blindness to the manner in which the actions were performed (cf. Mack & Rock, 1998).  Thus, 
while participants in this experiment appeared to code actions in terms of goals, it is possible that 
drawing attention to the manner in which the actions are performed would shift the 
representation involved in automatic imitation from the level of goals to that of movements. 
Experiment 2 
Imitation of Impossible Movements 
 18 
The second experiment was designed to explicitly test whether a change in attentional 
focus from goals to movements would shift participants tendencies to imitate movements instead 
of goals.  Participants were told at the beginning of the experiment that they would see both 
“natural” and “impossible” finger movements.  Given that similar manipulations (Memelink & 
Hommel, 2006) have been shown to shift the attentional weighting of stimulus dimensions, we 
hypothesized that the new instructions should have the effect of increasing the attentional 
weighting of movements – relative to goals – and should lead to a reduction in the effects of 
automatic imitation following observation of impossible finger movements.  That is, attentional 
weighting may serve to highlight the specific movements of a perceived action even though the 
tendency to imitate actions at the level of movements would not occur spontaneously. 
Participants 
 A new sample of 24 University of Chicago students (15 female; 9 male) between 18 and 
34 years of age participated.  All were right handed as determined by the Edinburgh Inventory, 
M = 78.66, range: 50 – 100, naive as to the purpose of the study, and paid for their participation.  
An additional four participants were excluded from analyses, one due to an error rate exceeding 
25%, two who claimed to be “double-jointed,” and one who claimed not to have noticed that 
there were two types of movement, clearly not having attended to the instructions. 
Apparatus and Materials 
 All materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
Design and Procedure 
 Procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1, except that participants were told 
while being given instructions that some of the finger movements they would see were “natural” 
and some were “impossible”. 
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Results and Discussion 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on mean RT with compatibility 
(compatible, incompatible) and movement (possible, impossible) as variables.  Error trials and 
trials in which RT was faster than 200 ms or slower than 1,000 ms were excluded from analysis.  
The results revealed a significant compatibility effect, F(1, 23) = 5.12, p < .05, partial η2 = .182 
(see Figure 4); responses were faster to compatible (308.71 ms) than to incompatible (314.00) 
actions, again revealing an overall automatic imitation tendency.  In contrast to Experiment 1, 
there was a significant interaction between compatibility and movement, F(1, 23) = 7.75, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .252,  indicating that the amount of automatic imitation was modulated by whether a 
possible or impossible action was observed.  Whereas planned comparisons revealed automatic 
imitation in response to possible finger movements (9.65 ms), t(23) = 3.92, p < .001, there was 
no such effect was revealed in response to impossible finger movements (.93 ms), t(23) = .30, 
n.s.; this difference between conditions was significant, t(23) = 2.78, p < .02 (see Figure 4).  As 
in Experiment 1, overall RT (collapsed across compatible and incompatible trials) was 
comparable to possible (311.63 ms), and impossible (311.08 ms) actions, F(1, 23) = .11, n.s. , 
partial η2 = .005. 
Errors occurred on 2.25% of trials, and 1.43% of trials were excluded due to RT under 
200 ms or exceeding 1,000 ms.  Significantly more errors were made on incompatible (2.68%), 
than on compatible (1.82%), trials, t(23) = 2.10, p < .05, mirroring the RT data, though this effect 
did not differ significantlyinteract with the difference between possible and impossible 
movements, t(23) = .59, n.s. 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE *** 
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The effects of instructing participants about the presence of impossible finger movements 
was examined by comparing the difference in automatic imitation between possible and 
impossible movements between Experiments 1 and 2
3
.  This difference was significantly greater 
in Experiment 2 (8.72 ms) than in Experiment 1 (-.87 ms), t(26) = 2.64, p < .02, demonstrating 
that notifying participants that they would see the impossible movements had a significant 
influence on modulating the magnitude of automatic imitation. 
These results suggest that common coding of actions can occur either at the level of goals 
or of movements depending on the direction of attention to different aspects of the action.  It thus 
appears that attentional weighting of features operates similarly for automatic imitation (this 
study) and for other S-R tasks involving spatial compatibility (e.g., Memelink & Hommel, 2005).  
In Experiment 1 when participants were not cued to attend to the movements, the coding of 
actions appeared to be in terms of goals, as comparable automatic imitation was elicited by 
biomechanically possible and impossible movements.  In Experiment 2, when participants’ 
attention was drawn to the manner in which the movement was executed, differences in 
automatic imitation were found depending on whether or not the movement could be performed 
by the observer.  Together, the results from these two experiments suggest that common coding 
can occur either at the level of goals or of movements depending on the direction of attention and 
the instructions given to participants, although coding at the level of goals appears to be the more 
commondefault response. 
One potentially trivial explanation for the difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is that 
participants in Experiment 1 may simply not have noticed the impossible movements.  As 
reported above, however, while a few participants in Experiment 1 did fail to notice the 
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impossible movements, most did notice them.  Furthermore, participants who were explicitly 
asked to judge whether the actions were possible strongly rated the ‘impossible’ movements as 
impossible.  Thus, the difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is better explained as a function 
of the level of coding at which the actions were coded. 
Another interpretation that needs to be considered is that the drawing of attention to the 
impossible movements in Experiment 2 may have  led these movements to become distracting on 
account of their novelty and strangeness.  On If this interpretation was correct, rather than being 
interpreted as impossible, these actionsthen the impossible movements may simply have been 
seen as weird, or unusual, which could  disrupting performance and leading to a ceiling effect 
that masking masked the automatic imitation effect.  In this case, responses should have been 
slower to impossible, than to possible, actions.  As we reported, however, the overall RTs did not 
differ significantly between the two conditions, and were even slightly faster than those in 
Experiment 1.  Moreover, RT on incompatible trials in this experiment was actually faster to 
impossible (311.55 ms) than to possible (316.45) actions, t(23) = 2.12, p < .05, implying that 
response to the impossible movements are not at ceiling.  This pattern suggests the absence of a 
compatibility effect fromin the impossible finger movements condition, rather than its 
maskinghigher RTs masking the effect.  These considerations suggest that the novelty of the 
impossible actions cannot account for the lack of automatic imitation to impossible actions in 
this experiment.  Nevertheless, in order to definitively rule out this possibility and test the 
generalizability of these effects, a third and final experiment was conducted. 
Experiment 3 
If the difference in automatic imitation of biomechanically possible and impossible 
movements observed in Experiment 2 is due to the unfamiliarity, or strangeness of the 
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impossible finger movements leading to a ceiling effect, this pattern should be observed 
independent of the task, and affect other forms of S-R compatibility as well.  If, however, 
modulation of the response in Experiment 2 was due to the impossibility of the actions, this 
sensitivity should be specific to automatic imitation.  To examine this issue, Experiment 3 
examined whether spatial S-R compatibility (cf. Simon, 1969) would be modulated by whether 
the stimuli were biomechanically possible or impossible.  As the “leftness” or “rightness” of an 
action is unaffected by whether the constituent movements are biomechanically possible or 
impossible, spatial S-R compatibility should not be affected by that manipulation.  As in 
Experiment 2, participants were told at the beginning of the experiment that they would see both 
“natural” and “impossible” finger movements. 
Experiments 1 and 2 tested for response priming as a function of the anatomical match 
between the stimulus and response fingers by having participants respond on the basis of the 
relative spatial position of the fingers (analogous to Experiment 3b in the study of Bertenthal et 
al., 2006).  This Eexperiment 3, in contrast, tested for response priming as a function of the 
stimulus and response sharing the same spatial code,  participants were instructed to make 
responses based on the anatomical identity of the moving finger (analogous to Experiment 3a in 
the study of Bertenthal et al.).  In both cases, one dimension (spatial compatibility or anatomical 
compatibility) is held constant by making it the basis for response, allowing manipulation of the 
compatibility of the other dimension via presentation of either a left- or a right-hand. 
Participants 
 A new sample of 24 University of Chicago students (13 female; 11 male) between the 
ages of 18 and 28 participated.  All were right handed as determined by the Edinburgh Inventory, 
M = 81.66, range: 37.5 – 100, naive as to the purpose of the study, and paid for their 
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participation.  An additional four participants were excluded from analyses, one due to a 
computer error, one due to an error rate exceeding 25%, and two who claimed to be “double-
jointed”. 
Apparatus and Materials 
 All materials were identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Design and Procedure 
The procedure used in this experiment was almost identical to the second experiment, and 
included the same instructions concerning the presentation of both natural and impossible finger 
movement.  The one difference between the experiments was that participants were instructed to 
imitate the stimulus finger that moved by pressing the response button with their anatomically 
matching finger.  Thus, participants responded to the observation of the index finger tapping by 
pressing the “1” key with their index finger, and they responded to the observation of the middle 
finger tapping by pressing the “3” key with their middle finger.  When the left hand was 
presented, the correct response was spatially compatible with the observed moving finger (see 
Figure 1); the observed index finger corresponded to the left stimulus in the display and served 
as a prime for the participant’s left response finger (i.e., the index finger).  Similarly, the middle 
finger appeared on the right and served as a prime for the participants’ right response finger (i.e., 
the middle finger).  By contrast, when the right hand was presented, this pattern was reversed 
and the correct response was spatially incompatible with the stimulus finger. 
Results and Discussion 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on mean RT with compatibility 
(compatible, incompatibley) and movement (possible, impossible) as variables.  Error trials and 
trials in which RT was faster than 200 ms or slower than 1,000 ms were excluded from analysis.  
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There was a significant effect of compatibility, F(1, 23) = 178.45, p < .0001, partial η2 = .886 
(see Figure 5); responses were faster to spatially compatible (341.23 ms) than incompatible 
(380.63 ms) finger movements.  , This indicatesing that a spatial code shared between stimulus 
and response facilitated performance, consistent with our prior findings using the same paradigm 
(Bertenthal et al., 2006, Exp. 3a) and as well as a large body of research on spatial S-R 
compatibility.  Like Experiment 1, and unlike Experiment 2, there was no interaction between 
movement and compatibility, F(1, 23) = .09, n.s., partial η2 = .004.  Planned comparisons 
revealed comparable very similar spatial compatibility effects in response to both possible (38.66 
ms), t(23) = 14.06, p < .0001, and impossible (40.15 ms), t(23) = 8.61, p < .0001, finger 
movements (see Figure 4), which did not differ significantly, t(23) = .31, n.s. 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Unlike the first two experimntsexperiments, participants in this experiment were 
intentionally imitating the finger movements on each trial.  If the impossible finger movements 
were distracting, then, it might have been expected that participants would be able to imitate the 
possible finger movements more quickly than the impossible ones.  In contrast to this prediction, 
response times were similar for possible (360 ms) and impossible (361 ms) actions, F(1, 23) = 
.34, n.s., partial η2 = .014.  This was true as well when compatible, t(23) = .18, n.s., and 
incompatible, t(23) = .34, n.s., trials were examined separately with planned comparisons.  Thus, 
while automatic imitation in Experiment 2 was sensitive to the difference between possible and 
impossible movements, the same was not true for intentional imitation in this experiment, even 
though the representation for movements was again primed by the instructions.  This is 
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suggestive of processing differences between automatic and deliberate forms of imitation, 
though, of course, it is difficult to make claims on the basis of a null result. 
Errors were made on 5.81% of trials, and 1.91% of trials were excluded due to RT under 
200 ms or exceeding 1,000 ms.  Significantly more errors were made on incompatible (8.26%) 
than on compatible (3.36%) trials, t(23) = 6.16, p < .0001.  This difference was significant for 
both possible (5.05%), t(23) = 5.05, p < .0001, and impossible (4.74%) actions, t(23) = 6.36, p < 
.0001, but there was no significant difference between them, t(23) = .41, n.s. 
The difference in compatibility effects was significantly greater for automatic imitation in 
Experiment 2 than for spatial compatibility in this experiment
4
, t(25) = 2.26, p < .05, suggesting 
that the observation of impossible finger movements differentially affected automatic imitation 
and spatial compatibility. 
General Discussion 
The aim of this research was twofold: (1) to investigate the attentional weighting effects 
of instructions on automatic imitation, and (2) to test whether common coding of an observed 
action is limited to the goal (or distal effect) of an action or is sensitive to movements as well.  
By manipulating the biomechanical possibility of the movement while holding the goal constant, 
we tested whether actions are automatically imitated at the level of goals or of movements.  
When the experimenter made no mention of the difference between possible and impossible 
actions, comparable automatic imitation was elicited from both types of action (Experiment 1), 
even though participants were generally aware of the a difference.  This suggests that the actions 
were coded at the level of goals (i.e., tapping a surface), rather than at the level of their 
constitutiveconstituent movements.  When the experimenter instructed participants at the 
beginning of the experiment that they would see both “natural” and “biomechanically 
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impossible” actions, automatic imitation was eliminated for the impossible – but not the possible 
– actions (Experiment 2).  This sensitivity to the manner in which the action was performed was 
specific to automatic imitation, not affecting spatial S-R compatibility (Experiment 3). 
Attentional Weighting Effects on Automatic Imitation 
As described in the introduction, numerous studies report that the magnitude of spatial S-
R compatibility is affected by the manner in which responses are described to participants (e.g., 
Hommel, 1993; Memelink & Hommel, 2006; Vu & Proctor, 2001, 2002; Wenke & Frensch, 
2005; Wenke et al., 2006), a phenomenon which Hommel et al. (2001) term intentional or 
attentional weighting depending on whether the description modulated an aspect of the response 
or of the stimulus, respectively.  The present results extend those findings in two ways.  First, 
they show that similar weighting effects modulate automatic imitation.  They dovetail in this 
respect with the recent findings of Bach, Peatfield, and Tipper (in press2007), who found that the 
degree of spatial attention to a body part affects the extent of automatic imitation elicited.  
Second, while Hommel (1993) demonstrated that spatial S-R compatibility could be manipulated 
by describing the participant’s response action in different ways (intentional weighting of 
action), the present findings show a similar modulation of automatic imitation by describing the 
stimulus action differently (attentional weighting of action).  This evidence suggests that 
common coding of action is not purely stimulus driven, but is mediated by top-down influences.  
What matters is not the nature of the stimulus, per se, but how the stimulus is represented by the 
participant. 
These results support the hypothesis of Rizzolatti et al. (2002) that both high- and low-
level resonance mechanisms underlie imitation in humans.  This resonance can occur at the level 
of movements as well as of goals.  There is, however, a caveat to this conclusion.  While 
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common coding occurred at multiple levels of representation, the default level appeared to be the 
goal of the action.  This finding is consistent with other results suggesting the important role of 
goals in imitation (e.g., Wohlschläger et al., 2003).  Even young infants appear to find the goal of 
an action, rather than the manner in which it is performed, most salient (Meltzoff, 1995; 
Woodward, 1998).  Wohlschläger et al. (2003) do acknowledge that perceived actions may be 
coded in terms of their movements, but only when they are not directed at a distal object.  The 
present results, in contrast, suggest that explicit expectations and changes in attentional focus, 
rather than the presence or absence of an object, may determine whether high- or low-level 
resonance mechanisms are operative. 
The present results also provide a bridge between two seemingly contradictory sets of 
findings.  On the one hand, the behavioral results from Experiment 1 dovetail with recent fMRI 
(Costantini et al., 2005) and TMS (Romani et al., 2005) findings that biomechanically possible 
and impossible actions are coded similarilysimilarly by mirror/common coding mechanisms; on 
the other, the results of Experiment 2 are consistent with recent behavioral (Casile & Giese, 
2006), developmental (Longo & Bertenthal, 2006; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005), 
and neuroimaging (Buccino et al., 2004; Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006; Costantini et al., 2005) 
studies relating the representation of perceived actions to the observer’s own ability to perform 
the action.  Calvo-Merino and colleagues (2006), for example, presented expert ballet dancers 
with examples of dance moves that either were in their own motor repertoire or were performed 
only by opposite-gender dancers, finding increased activation in mirror circuits for the same-
gender moves.  These actions differ qualitatively in terms of what actions they are; the possible 
and impossible stimuli used by Costantini et al. and Romani et al., in contrast, differ only in how 
the action in performed.  Whereas it was obvious that different movements and actions were 
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involve d in the two ballet dances, the difference between the possible and impossible 
movements used Iin the latter two experiments were much less noticeable.  The results from the 
current experiment show that automatic imitation is either sensitive (Experiment 2) or insensitive 
(Experiment 1) to whether or not an action is in the observer’s motor repertoire depending on 
whether participants’ attention is explicitly drawn to the manner in which the actions are 
performed. 
The Automaticity of ‘Automatic’ Imitation 
According to traditional models of automaticity in cognitive psychology such as those of 
LaBerge and Samuels (1974), Posner and Snyder (1975), and Schneider and Shiffrin (1977), 
‘automatic’ processes generally share three primary characteristics: they are (1) capacity-free and 
effortless, (2) stimulus driven, and (3) operate outside of awareness.  The present findings 
showing the effects of attentional weighting on automatic imitation suggest that this process does 
not meet the second of these criteria.  Thus, it is questionable as to whether what we have been 
calling “automatic imitation” is, strictly speaking, automatic in this sense (cf. Bach et al., in 
press).  Tipper, Paul, and Hayes (2006) recently reported similar results related to the activation 
of motor programs by the perception of object affordances. 
 Although automatic imitation is not immune to top down influences, it is just as clearly 
not controlled, being generally unintentional and outside of conscious awareness.  This 
highlights a more general problem with the traditional concept of automaticity in that very few – 
if  any – processes can be neatly characterized as either ‘automatic’ or ‘controlled’, though these 
designations were traditionally proposed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  Logan and 
Cowan (1984), for example, point out that typical examples of purportedly automatic processes 
such as reading, or driving, are in fact under robust cognitive control in that we can easily decide 
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to stop reading or driving at any time.  Even more problematic, prototypically automatic 
processes, such as word-reading in the Stroop paradigm, are highly susceptible to the direction of 
attention and task goals (Bargh, 1989; Carr, 1992). 
 Given that virtually no processes are entirely free from some type of control, an 
increasing number of authors are defining automaticity in terms of the level of processing at 
which control occurs rather than in terms of whether or not a process is controlled (it always is, 
to some extent).  Neumann (1984), for example, argues that we should conceive of “automatic 
processing not as lacking control, but as being controlled at levels below the level of conscious 
awareness” (p. 256).  Bargh (1989), similarly, writes that “[w]hat all [automatic processes] seem 
to have in common is that they are autonomous, not requiring conscious control (at least to some 
extent) once they are initiated” (p. 38).  Hommel (2000) argues that automatic and intentional 
processes should be thought of as occurring at different points in time, not as mutually exclusive.  
On this view, intentional and attentional weighting creates a certain task set; once that task set is 
instantiated, behaviors follow automatically from stimuli, in what Hommel terms a prepared 
reflex.  The present results suggest that automatic imitation is consistent with this sort of 
prepared reflex; whether a particular stimulus will elicit automatic imitation depends on the task 
set of the participant (which can be manipulated by instructions), but once the task set is in place, 
imitation follows in a completely automatic fashion. 
Automatic and Intentional Imitation 
One implication of this research is that the findings show the importance of 
distinguishing between automatic and intentional imitation.  In Experiment 3 participants were 
instructed to imitate the observed finger movement (i.e., intentional imitation) and responded as 
fast to impossible as to the possible movements.  By contrast, participants responded faster to the 
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anatomically compatible movements vs. incompatible movements in Experiment 2 (i.e., 
automatic imitation) only when the movements were biomechanically possible.  If intentional 
imitation relied on the same neural network as automatic imitation, then participants in 
Experiment 3 should have responded more quickly to possible than to impossible movements 
because the observation of the latter could not be completely matched to the motor response.  
Contrary to this prediction, participants responded as quickly when imitating impossible as 
opposed to possible movements.  This discrepancy in the results is suggestive of significant 
fundamental differences between automatic and intentional forms of imitation, a distinction that 
has often been overlooked in the literature.  One intriguing possibility is that while both goals 
and movements may mediate automatic imitation, goals may be of special importance in 
intentional imitation (cf. Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Wohlschläger et al., 2003).   
Williamson and Markman (2006) argue that children (and perhaps adults) intentionally 
imitate observed actions conservatively (i.e., by replicating the precise movements) when the 
reason for the observed action is unclear, whereas they imitate the goal by the most convenient 
means when the reason for the goal is known.  In the present study, the purpose of the observed 
finger movements was entirely ambiguous.  Nevertheless, the default mode of automatic 
imitation was in terms of the goal, rather than the manner in which the action was performed.  
This again suggests a potential difference between automatic and intentional imitation. 
As a final comment we wish to point out that, along with the study of Longo (2006), the 
present data offer the first unequivocal evidence of automatic imitation of a computer-generated 
virtual hand.  Perani et al. (2001), using PET, found that only a video image of a real hand 
activated the human mirror system; neither a robot-arm stimulus nor a virtual hand was 
sufficient.  Other studies have found similar results comparing actions produced by humans or by 
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mechanical actors (e.g., Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, 
Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004).  By contrast, Press et al. (2005) showed that the perception of 
actions performed by a robotic arm resulted in automatic imitation, though less than that elicited 
by a video image of a real arm.  Similarly, the computer-generated virtual hand in the present 
study was clearly sufficient to elicit automatic imitation, at least when the movement was 
biomechanically possible.  In contrast to the findings of Press and colleagues, the magnitude of 
the imitation effect observed in this study is comparable to that observed from a video of a real 
hand in our previous study (Bertenthal et al., 2006).  One possible reason for this difference is 
that the virtual hand used in the current study was so realistic that participants may not have 
interpreted it as computer-generated.  It may be that if attention were drawn to the fact that the 
hand is computer-generated, automatic imitation would be reduced or eliminated.  Additional 
research is needed to address this issue. 
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Footnotes 
1) The term goal is sometimes equated with the term intention.  In this paper a goal will refer 
exclusively to the distal effect or the end state of the action, and not to some motivation for 
the action. 
2) At least when attention was not overtly drawn to the artificiality of the virtual hand. 
3) As these distributions appeared to be heavy-tailed, Yuen’s (1974) t-test for trimmed means 
was used, with 20% trimming (see Wilcox, 2005). 
4) As with the comparison between Experiments 1 and 2, this comparison used Yuen’s (1974) t-
test for trimmed means, with 20% trimming. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Stimuli used in the experiments.  Only the final frame of each animation is shown.  The 
top panel displays the possible movements, and the bottom row panel displays the impossible 
movements.  Within each panel, the top row displays the finger movements compatible with the 
participants’ responses; the bottom panel row   displays the finger movement incompatible with 
the participants’ responses. 
 
Figure 2: Mean ratings of the stimuli.  Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Figure 3: Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 1 as a function of compatibility 
(compatible or incompatible) and movement type (possible or impossible).  Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
Figure 4:  Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 2 as a function of compatibility 
(compatible or incompatible) and movement type (possible or impossible).  Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
Figure 5: Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 3 as a function of compatibility 
(compatible or incompatible) and movement type (possible or impossible).  Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
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